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Abstract 
Explicitation and implicitation are two translation studies concepts that have given rise to a vast 
array of studies. These studies are, however, often difficult to compare, primarily because explici-
tation and implicitation have been interpreted differently, not rarely intuitively, by many translation 
studies researchers. This is due to the fact that the underlying concepts of explicitness and im-
plicitness have not yet been satisfactorily defined for translation studies purposes. It is therefore 
the aim of this article to define explicitness and implicitness. This will be carried out from a 
relevance-theoretic perspective. Once explicitness and implicitness are defined, it is possible to 
define explicitation and implicitation and give both concepts the theoretical base they need. Then, 
the question is addressed if explicitation and implicitation can be distinguished from addition, 
omission and substitution. Finally, it is suggested that explicitation and implicitation are both appli-
cations of one more general translation strategy involving minimizing risk and maximizing rele-
vance for the target text audience. 
1 Introduction 
A general problem within translation studies is the terminological vagueness surrounding 
its core concepts (cf. Mayoral 2001: 67, quoted in translation in Marco 2007: 66). Through-
out the relatively young history of the discipline, various translation studies researchers 
have attributed different concepts to one term, or vice versa, one concept to different 
terms. This was convincingly argued by Gambier (2009: 78-79, 2010: 417). He illustrated 
the missing uniformity of the translation studies metalanguage by focusing on terminology 
used to refer to (a) decision-making processes at a macro level, (b) decision-making 
processes at a micro level, and (c) the observable outcome of those processes in the 
target text. Recalling military terminology, he suggested to use the terms strategy, tactic 
and solution respectively, in which he did not, unlike Chesterman (2005: 26), differentiate 
between conscious and automatic tactics.1 As the distinction between conscious and 
automatic processes is not relevant for product-oriented, corpus-based translation studies, 
                                                
1 Chesterman (2005: 26) used the terms method, strategy, tactic and shift for what Gambier (2009: 78-
79, 2010: 417) called strategy, conscious tactic, automatic tactic and solution, respectively. 
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which will be the focus of this article, we will adhere to the terms suggested by Gambier, 
allowing for Chesterman’s terminology to occur in quotations only.   
The aim of Gambier’s taxonomy was to strengthen translation studies as a discipline 
by making translation research more transparent through uniform terminology (Gambier 
2009: 63). This is the intent of the present article, too. Its focus, however, is not on the 
concepts of strategy, tactic and solution, but on explicitation and implicitation, two con-
cepts that have been part of translation studies ever since their introduction by Vinay and 
Darbelnet in 1958 (Vinay/Darbelnet 1958/1977: 9-10). Over a period of almost sixty years, 
explicitation and implicitation have developed into two of the most central subjects in 
corpus-based translation studies. Inspired by the explicitation hypothesis (Blum-Kulka 
1986: 19), the asymmetry hypothesis (Klaudy/Károly 2005: 14) and named as possible 
translation universals in the search for universal characteristics of a translated text 
(Baker 1993: 243), explicitation and implicitation have given rise to a vast array of studies 
involving numerous languages and language pairs, an enumeration of which here would 
inevitably be incomplete. Paradoxically, the attention given to explicitation and implicita-
tion has not been directly proportional to the understanding of what they refer to. On the 
contrary, studies on explicitation and implicitation are of a very heterogeneous nature, 
which has made it difficult, if not impossible to compare their findings and to come to 
conclusive insights into the meanings of explicitation and implicitation in and for trans-
lation and translation studies (cf. Kamenická 2007: 45; Becher 2010b: 3-4; Murtisari 2013: 
315). 
For this reason, the starting-point of this article is that both highly complex concepts 
have never been fully understood, nor satisfactorily defined in translation studies. Generally, 
explicitation is perceived as involving something being more explicit or less implicit in 
one text as compared to another text, and implicitation as involving something being 
more implicit or less explicit in one text as compared to another text. Variants of these 
rather roughly formulated definitions can be found throughout the translation studies 
literature, having in common the indeterminacy of one or both concepts of explicit and 
implicit (cf. Murtisari 2013: 315). This, we believe, can be attributed to a long-time 
missing theoretical foundation of what the features of explicitness and implicitness are 
and the translation aspects to which they are applicable. Hence, explicitation and 
implicitation have been interpreted rather intuitively in translation studies. 
This intuitive approach to explicitation and implicitation might be explained from the 
fact that the words explicit and implicit and their dictionary equivalents in other languages 
are part of everyday language. Consequently, most language users have some intuitive 
idea of what explicitness and implicitness are. Compare, for instance, the following 
utterances (1-4): 
(1)  I’m here. 
(2)  I am standing on the corner. 
(3)  I am now standing on the street corner. 
(4)  I am now standing on the street corner where we were going to meet. 
Hinde De Metsenaere & Sonia Vandepitte trans-kom 10 [3] (2017): 385-419 
Towards a Theoretical Foundation for Explicitation and Implicitation Seite 387 
 
 
 
Given that utterances (1-4) refer to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar 
communicative situation, most people will intuitively agree that there is an increase in 
explicitness (hence: explicitation) from (1) to (4) and an increase in implicitness (hence: 
implicitation) from (4) to (1), even if they do not rely on a solid, theory-based definition of 
what explicitness and implicitness entail. Because many translation studies researchers, 
too, have relied on such intuitive understanding of explicitness and implicitness rather 
than a clear definition (cf. Becher 2010b: 4-8, 2011: 20-76), the interpretations and defi-
nitions of explicitation and implicitation remain vague and sometimes very divergent from 
one another. 
Explicitation and implicitation have been conceived as strategies, as tactics or as 
solutions (cf. Pápai 2004: 145). Their application as strategies or tactics has been suggested 
to happen consciously or automatically (cf. Klaudy/Károly 2005: 15). Obligatory, optional, 
pragmatic and translation-inherent forms have been postulated (cf. Klaudy 1998/2008: 
106-107). They have been claimed to be observable through process-oriented research 
(e.g. computer logging, eye tracking and concurrent or subsequent verbalization as in 
Englund Dimitrova 2005: 55-76 or Jakobsen 2003: 69-71, 2006: 103-104, 2011: 37-41) 
or through product-oriented research when, for instance, comparing a translation to its 
source text or to comparable non-translated texts (cf. Baker 1993: 243; Olohan 2004: 
92-94). As we will show in sections 2 and 3 much terminology remains to be clarified 
when studying explicitation and implicitation. This article aims to contribute to this 
clarification. 
The article is structured as follows: First, a brief overview will be given of the different 
concepts that can be related to explicitation and implicitation in translation studies 
(section 2). Then, recent definitions of explicitness and implicitness in translation studies 
will be discussed and relevance theory will be introduced (section 3). The main 
assumption underlying this article and the definitions that will be formulated is namely 
that translation is an act of communication, in which utterances rather than sentences 
are translated from one language into another; sentences are linguistically encoded 
constructs that can have many different meanings in as many contexts, whereas 
utterances are always part of a bigger unit that will limit their meaning possibilities. At the 
same time, explicitation and implicitation are relevant to translation, in that they refer to 
notions that are closely related to the translation process, and comparison of the level of 
explicitness of utterances is a translation studies research issue. We therefore want to 
argue that translation should be studied in the light of a cognitive communication theory 
(cf. Blum-Kulka 1986: 18; Gutt 1991/2000: 22-23; Pym 2005: 39; Alves/Conçalves 2003: 4; 
Murtisari 2013: 320). Relevance theory – already introduced into translation studies in 
1991 by Gutt and further employed in Alvez and Conçalves (2003) – will be considered 
the most appropriate theoretical framework for explicitation and implicitation, mainly 
because of its cognitive and pragmatic approach (actions, characteristics and how they 
are perceived are fundamentally tied to individuals, to readers, writers and translators, 
and to the purposes pursued by the text). Importantly, relevance theory also provides an 
explicit-implicit distinction which directly lends itself to defining explicitness and implicitness. 
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Section 4 continues with definitions of explicitness and implicitness, after which defini-
tions of explicitation and implicitation in translation will be formulated (section 5). The 
question will be addressed if explicitation and implicitation can be distinguished from 
addition, omission and substitution (section 6). Finally, it will be argued that explicitation 
and implicitation are both applications of one general translation strategy involving 
minimizing risk and maximizing relevance for the target audience (section 7).  
2 Explicitation and Implicitation in Translation Studies: Outlining 
the Scope 
Explicitation and implicitation may refer to various concepts in translation studies. In this 
section, we will briefly discuss this variety and highlight the concepts that we will focus 
on in this article. 
2.1 Strategies, Tactics and Solutions 
Following the taxonomy suggested by Gambier (2009: 78-79, 2010: 417), explicitation 
and implicitation may refer to strategies, tactics and solutions alike. As strategies, 
explicitation and implicitation are decision-making processes possibly determined by a 
translation commissioner or client in a translation brief, shaping the general nature of the 
relation between source and target text (cf. Vermeer 2000: 229-232). For example, if a 
tourist information leaflet is to be translated for a foreign audience, a more explicit target 
text as compared to the source text may be required, whereas target audience preferences 
may require translators not to be too explicit about, for instance, vulgar language in a 
source text. 
As tactics, be they conscious or automatic, explicitation and implicitation are decision-
making processes situated at the local level. For example, deciding to make certain 
historical and cultural references more explicit in the translation of the touristic information 
leaflet, or deciding to make vulgar language more implicit in translation can be considered 
as explicitation and implicitation tactics, respectively. Because these processes are 
going on in the “little black box” (Holmes 2000: 177) of the translator’s mind, invisible for 
the translation studies researcher, they must be reconstructed by triangulating data from 
computer logging, eye tracking and concurrent or subsequent verbalization (cf. Englund 
Dimitrova 2005: 55-76; Jakobsen 2003: 69-71, 2006: 103-104, 2011: 37-41).  
As solutions, explicitation and implicitation are the observable outcome of the decision-
making processes, visible in the target text. They are often believed to be relatively easy 
to observe and to count, which may account for their popularity as a research topic in 
product-oriented (quantitative) corpus-based translation studies (cf. Baker 2004: 168-169).  
For the remainder of this article, we will concentrate on explicitation and implicitation 
as solutions, although explicitation and implicitation as tactics and as strategies will also 
be briefly referred to. 
Hinde De Metsenaere & Sonia Vandepitte trans-kom 10 [3] (2017): 385-419 
Towards a Theoretical Foundation for Explicitation and Implicitation Seite 389 
 
 
 
2.2 S- and T-Explicitation and S- and T-Implicitation 
When discussing explicitation and implicitation as solutions, it is necessary to differentiate 
further between what Krüger (2014: 157) called S- and T-explicitation and -implicitation.2 
Based on Chesterman (2004: 39), S-explicitation and S-implicitation are understood as 
characteristics of the target text as compared to its source text; T-explicitation and T-
implicitation as characteristics of the target text as compared to non-translated text. 
These T-variants emerged after Baker (1993: 236-237, 242-243) introduced comparable 
corpora into translation studies, which led to a paradigm shift, causing the focus of trans-
lation studies to partly turn from the comparison of characteristics of source and target 
texts to the comparison of characteristics of translated and non-translated texts (cf. 
Olohan/Baker 2000: 35-36).  
Although both S- and T-explicitation and S- and T-implicitation have co-occurred in 
corpus-based translation studies and given rise to interesting and insightful research, 
Krüger (2014: 164-167) convincingly argued that T-explicitation and T-implicitation are 
problematic for two reasons. First, studies comparing a target text with both its source 
text and a comparable non-translated text can generate contradicting results: if the target 
text is more implicit than its source text, one can claim that there is implicitation, whereas 
if that same target text is more explicit than the chosen comparable non-translated text, 
because, maybe by chance, the comparable text is less explicit, one can claim that there 
is explicitation (Krüger 2014: 164-166). Secondly, T-explicitation and T-implicitation can 
never be captured by translation process research, as there is no translation process 
between the target text and the comparable non-translated text. Thus, assuming the 
existence of T-explicitation and T-implicitation carries the risk of  
retrospectively attribut[ing] explicitation [and implicitation] decisions to the translator which 
he or she never made in the first place, since one of the comparison standards (the original 
target-language texts) falls completely outside the translator’s cognitive reality and trans-
lational action.    (Krüger 2014: 167)  
Krüger therefore suggests to abandon the concept of T-explicitation and -implicitation 
and to replace it by the concept of comparative explicitness: “What comparable corpus 
studies such as Olohan and Baker’s investigate is […] not explicitation but rather the 
comparative explicitness of translated and non-translated texts in the same language” 
(Krüger 2014: 170).  
We agree with Krüger (2014) that the terms of explicitation and implicitation should 
only be used when comparing source and target texts, and not when comparing trans-
lated with comparable non-translated texts. For the former we will therefore use the terms 
explicitation and implicitation (without the capitalized prefix S-, which then becomes 
redundant); for the latter we will adopt the term comparative explicitness.  
                                                
2  Krüger (2014: 157-171) only discussed S- and T-explicitation. Implicitation was only mentioned in the 
margin of his article as the counterpart of explicitation (Krüger 2014: 165). Following Toury’s view from 
1987 already that “all shifts fall into dichotomous pairs” (Toury 2004: 23), we believe that what Krüger 
claimed for explicitation can also be claimed for implicitation. We will therefore continue to talk about 
S- and T-explicitation and S- and T-implicitation. 
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2.3 Obligatory, Optional, Pragmatic or Translation-inherent Explicitation and 
Implicitation 
Explicitation and implicitation as characteristics of a target text when compared to its 
source text are traditionally divided into maximally four categories. For Vinay and 
Darbelnet (1958/1977: 117), only lexicogrammatical differences between languages can 
prompt explicitation and implicitation, but with Nida (1964: 227-233), other differences 
triggering explicitation and implicitation were acknowledged as well: apart from differences 
in language systems, e.g. when the category of plural is obliged in one language but 
absent in another, Nida also discussed differences in language use, e.g. when a vocative 
is polite in one language but not in another, and which are triggered by differences in 
cultural background and world knowledge between audiences, e.g. when certain source 
cultural elements are (not) known in the target culture. These three categories were later 
labelled obligatory, optional and pragmatic respectively by Klaudy (1998/2008: 106-107).   
A fourth category that was based on Blum-Kulka (1986: 19) and Séguinot (1988: 
108) and firmly – though controversially – embedded in translation studies through 
Klaudy’s (1998/2008: 106-107) taxonomy is that of translation-inherent explicitation and 
implicitation, which can be “explained by one of the most pervasive, language-independent 
features of all translational activity, namely the necessity to formulate ideas in the target 
language that were originally conceived in the source language” (Klaudy 1998/2008: 
107). This fourth category resulted in numerous studies (cf. Becher 2011: 20-76 for an 
overview) and remained unchallenged until Becher revolted against what he called “a 
dogma in translation studies” (Becher 2010a: 1). Arguing that translation-inherent 
explicitation and implicitation had never been proven to exist, Becher suggested abandoning 
those notions (Becher 2010a: 7-16).  
Following Becher, we want to go one step further in reducing the number of explicitation 
and implicitation categories. We will argue that Klaudy’s optional and pragmatic categories 
both describe explicitation and implicitation due to language use and can thus be 
grouped together into a more general category, contrasting Klaudy’s obligatory category 
that is due to differences in language systems. In other words, it is our opinion that all 
instances of explicitation and implicitation can be classified into, on the one hand, a 
language systematic category that is dictated by differences in language systems, and, 
on the other hand, a pragmatic category that is triggered by any other differences. With 
Englund Dimitrova, we also allow for the borderline between both to be fuzzy (cf. Englund 
Dimitrova 2005: 36). We believe this dichotomy to be clearer and more informative for 
translation studies purposes, since it refers to the two entities – language and its broader 
context – that play such an important role in translation practice. 
3 Explicitness and Implicitness in Translation Studies 
Having outlined the scope of explicitation and implicitation in translation studies, we have 
yet to define both notions. However, prior to definitions of explicitation and implicitation 
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are definitions of explicitness and implicitness. In recent years, awareness that under-
standing of explicitness and implicitness is a prerequisite for understanding explicitation 
and implicitation has risen. Some translation studies researchers have indeed attempted 
to define explicitness and implicitness before defining explicitation and implicitation. In 
this section, we will discuss the works of four (groups of) translation studies researchers 
that have been influential in this domain.  
3.1 Hansen-Schirra, Neumann and Steiner 
Based on earlier work by Steiner (2005), Hansen-Schirra, Neumann and Steiner (2007) 
were among the first to apply explicitness and explicitation to corpus-based translation 
studies in a systematic manner. They related explicitness to density and directness and 
defined it as “a property of lexicogrammatical or cohesive structures and configurations 
in one text” (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 243). Implicitness referred to the 
feature of not being “lexicogrammatically [...] realized, but still part of the construction 
(unrealized participant roles, unrealized features in non-finite constructions […])” (Hansen-
Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 242). In other words, explicitness and implicitness were 
conceived “as a property of encoding, not as a property of the communicative act as 
such” (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 246) and thus restricted to the linguistic 
level.  
Explicitation, then, was considered “as a shift between source and target text, not as 
a comparison between comparable texts” (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 242). 
Unlike explicitness and implicitness, it was not described as a property of, but as “a process 
or a relationship between […] translationally related texts” (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/
Steiner 2007: 243). More specifically, explicitation was defined as follows: 
We assume explicitation if a translation […] realizes meaning (not only ideational, but also 
interpersonal and textual) more explicitly than its source text – more precisely, meanings not 
realized in the less explicit source variant but implicitly present in a theoretically-motivated 
sense. The resulting text is more explicit than its counterpart. Note that this definition delib-
erately excludes the indefinite number of possibilities through which meaning can simply be 
added to some text/discourse, without being in any motivated sense implicit in the source 
variant. […] What remains outside of our methodology is [thus] the simple ‘addition’ or 
‘omission’ of meanings without any grammatical or cohesive relationships between variants. 
    (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 243-244) 
Given that the project for which these definitions were developed was a corpus-based 
study that relied on quantitative results derived from automatically annotated data, the 
focus on lexicogrammatical and cohesive features was motivated by the argument that  
a methodologically empirical project will not consist of high-level interpretations of utterances 
by human interpreters, but of text corpora with relatively low-level lexicogrammatical and 
cohesive categories captured in multi-level annotations. The data thus yield information 
about properties of encoding, rather than about high-level interpretations of such data by 
human interactants.   (Hansen-Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 243) 
We acknowledge the value of the approach taken by Hansen-Schirra, Neuman and 
Steiner (2007), who restrict themselves to what can actually be observed and, hence, 
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restrict the notions of explicitness, implicitness and thus explicitation and implicitation. 
Nevertheless, we believe that neither their methodology nor the restricted focus neces-
sitated by it do justice to the complex nature of translation. The reason is twofold. First, 
translators do not simply translate lexicogrammatical and cohesive features from one 
language into another, but they interpret the meaning of utterances and then reformulate 
this interpretation in the target language. It is therefore highly questionable to study trans-
lation without taking this interpretation process into account. Secondly, other elements 
than only those lexicogrammatical and cohesive features that are not realized in the 
construction can be felt to be part of the utterance, too, such as, for example, the cultural 
background knowledge in the above-mentioned tourist information leaflet.  
3.2 Becher 
Partly relying on the work by Steiner (2005), too, Becher (2010a, 2011) formulated his 
definitions of explicitness, implicitness, explicitation and implicitation as follows: 
Explicitation is observed where a given target text is more explicit than the corresponding 
source text.    (Becher 2010a: 3) 
Implicitation is observed where a given target text is less explicit (more implicit) than the 
corresponding source text.  (Becher 2011: 19) 
Explicitness is the verbalization of information that the addressee might be able to infer if it 
were not verbalized.   (Becher 2010a: 3) 
Implicitness is the non-verbalization of information that the addressee might be able to infer.  
    (Becher 2010a: 2) 
To his definition of implicitness, Becher added:  
the definition deliberately avoids spelling out from where the addressee might infer the non-
verbalized information. […] It is of course legitimate and highly relevant to ask for the inferential 
sources that are available to the addressee. But we do not want this question to make our 
definition unnecessarily complicated.  (Becher 2010a: 3)  
About his definition of explicitness, he said: 
To put it somewhat informally, explicitness means saying something that the addressee might 
have understood anyway. From this definition, it also becomes clear that explicitness often 
(but not necessarily) entails redundancy, i.e. the encoding of information by means of more 
linguistic material than is necessary.  (Becher 2010a: 3) 
We want to argue that these definitions are problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
explicitness and implicitness were defined as an activity (“[non-]verbalization”, Becher 
2010a: 2) and it is questionable whether this kind of activity can be observed let alone 
be measured in a written text, whether it is a source or a target text. Secondly, explicit-
ness was explained as “the encoding of information by means of more linguistic material 
than is necessary” (Becher 2010a: 3), but it was left undecided when encoding could be 
considered as more “than is necessary” (Becher 2010a: 3) and thus as from which point 
one could say that explicitness occurs. In the same vain, it is unclear how information 
encoded by means of as much linguistic material as is necessary would be called, if it is 
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not called explicit. Thirdly, maintaining that explicitness entails redundancy becomes 
difficult when explicitation is defined as a characteristic that is “observed where a given 
target text is more explicit than the corresponding source text” (Becher 2010a: 3): why 
would it make sense to point out that something that is already encoded to a larger extent 
than necessary would become even more unnecessary? Fourthly and finally, the concept 
of information was deliberately left undefined, as was the possible source “from where 
the addressee might infer the non-verbalized information” (Becher 2010a: 3). While Becher 
avoided these specifications in order to prevent the definition from becoming “unneces-
sarily complicated” (Becher 2010a: 3), we notice that a theoretical foundation is missing, 
resulting in definitions that remain highly intuitive. We believe, however, that defining 
explicitness and implicitness within a theoretical framework does not overcomplicate 
matters.  
3.3 Krüger 
A theoretical foundation was suggested by Krüger (2013). He modelled explicitation and 
implicitation within a cognitive linguistic framework. Cognitive linguistics, he argued, 
could offer sufficient theoretical background to explain why and when information in the 
source and the target texts can be considered implicit or absent. This distinction has 
consequences for the assignment of the respective labels of explicitation/implicitation or 
addition/omission to certain differences between source and target texts (cf. Hansen-
Schirra/Neumann/Steiner 2007: 244). Although Krüger admitted that cognitive linguistics 
may not have all the answers to explain all aspects of translation and could only explain 
explicitation and implicitation “in a more or less straightforward manner” (Krüger 2013: 
309), he believed the theory to be sufficient to shed light on at least the linguistic dimension 
that translation undisputedly involves (Krüger 2013: 291). For this purpose, he combined 
Croft and Cruse’s (2004) notion of epistemic perspective, Clark’s (1996) notion of common 
ground, Pustejovsky’s (1991) qualia structure, Fillmore’s (1982) notion of frame and 
Langacker’s (1987, 2008) notion of domain and model of linguistic construal operations. 
Explicitness and implicitness, or at least “the view on explicitness and implicitness 
as adopted in the present article” (Krüger 2013: 296), were intuitively associated with 
concepts of Langacker’s (2008) model of linguistic construal operations. In this model, 
linguistic meaning is conceived as “involving two components, a particular conceptual 
component and a specific way of construing this content” (Krüger 2013: 294), in which 
the conceptual component can be compared “to a scene and the construal of this content 
to a particular way of viewing this scene” (Krüger 2013: 294). The construal operation 
that Krüger linked to explicitness/implicitness is that of specificity/schematicity: construing 
or describing a scene in greater detail leads to more specificity, whereas reducing the 
number of details leads to more schematicity, as is illustrated in construals (5-8), in which 
(5) is maximally schematic and there is an increase in specificity from (5) to (8): 
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(5) Something happened. 
(6) A person perceived a rodent. 
(7) A girl saw a porcupine. 
(8) An alert little girl wearing glasses caught a brief glimpse of a ferocious 
porcupine. (Krüger 2013: 296) 
Krüger then linked explicitness to specificity and encodedness, implicitness to schematicity 
and contextually inferredness:  
From the microscopic perspective, specificity and explicitness would refer to that part of a 
given conceptual content that is overtly linguistically encoded while schematicity and 
implicitness refer to that part of the content which underlies the overtly encoded part as 
“conceptual substrate” (Langacker 2008: 42) and which needs to be contextually inferred to 
arrive at the full content to be communicated.  (Krüger 2013: 296)  
Krüger thus interpreted explicitness and implicitness in a broader way than Hansen-
Schirra, Neumann and Steiner (2007): they are not restricted to lexicogrammatical and 
cohesive features of a construction, but involve the entire conceptual content as 
expressed by a construction. Based on this background, explicitation and implicitation 
were defined as follows: 
explicitation would occur when a given situation construed schematically in the source text is 
construed more specifically in the target text. In contrast, implicitation occurs when a situation 
described specifically in the source text is rendered more schematically in the target text. 
Explicitation and implicitation thus arise from a difference between the construal of a given 
source text and the construal of the corresponding target text and can therefore be charac-
terized as cross-linguistic construal operations.  (Krüger 2013: 297) 
To explain why explicitation and implicitation occur and how they can be distinguished 
from addition and omission respectively, Krüger referred to Clark’s (1996) notion of 
common ground between two people, which can be understood as “the sum of their 
mutual, common or joint knowledge, beliefs and suppositions” (Clark 1996: 93 quoted 
from Krüger 2013: 300). If information from the source text is not encoded in the target 
text, but is part of the common ground between writer and audience, this is an example 
of implicitation. If the same information is not part of the common ground, this is an 
example of omission. Vice versa, if information that is not in the source text is encoded 
in the target text, and if that information is part of the common ground between writer 
and audience, this is an example of explicitation. If the same information is not part of 
the common ground, this is an example of addition (Krüger 2013: 301, 306-309). 
However, this distinction, Krüger acknowledged, cannot be made entirely objectively 
(Krüger 2013: 310). 
Promising as the cognitive linguistic approach as suggested by Krüger (2013) may 
seem, we have certain reservations. To start, we judge the framework to be very complex 
and not straight-forward, as it is a collage of different theories that is built around an 
intuitive interpretation of explicitness and implicitness: explicitness and implicitness are 
not inherently part of the framework, but are forced into it when associated with the 
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concepts of specificity and schematicity respectively without giving arguments in favour 
of this association. Also, the focus is too much on the conceptual content as carried by 
the linguistic construction, rather than on the multi-layered content of the utterance that 
goes beyond the linguistic construction and which is crucial to translators’ process of 
interpretation and reformulation. Hence, Krüger's (2013) framework still approaches 
translation mainly as a linguistic act rather than an act of communication, although, by 
evoking the notion of common ground (a notion that was criticised by Sperber and Wilson 
(1995: 15-21)), the framework does acknowledge that communication plays an important 
part in translation. In certain aspects, the framework is reminiscent of relevance theory, 
which we believe to be a better, less intuitive and more cohesive candidate for explaining 
explicitness, implicitness, explicitation and implicitation. 
3.4 Relevance Theory 
At this point, an introduction to relevance theory is deemed necessary. According to rel-
evance theory (Sperber/Wilson 1995), utterances are used to communicate thoughts 
verbally – relevance theory uses the term assumptions to refer to these “thoughts treated 
by the individual as representations of the actual world (as opposed to fictions, desires, 
or representations of representations)” (Sperber/Wilson 1995: 2). However, when people 
engage in verbal communication, they do not encode all assumptions or all aspects of 
an assumption, because that would result in nearly endless utterances. To be optimally 
relevant, that is, to communicate what one wants to communicate without being 
hopelessly verbose, verbal communication is, from the perspective of the addressee, a 
combination of decoding, developing and inference. This is summarized in Figure 1. 
  
Hinde De Metsenaere & Sonia Vandepitte trans-kom 10 [3] (2017): 385-419 
Towards a Theoretical Foundation for Explicitation and Implicitation Seite 396 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Verbal communication according to relevance theory 
Implicatures 
 
(implicated premise) My mother and I want to go to the movies together. 
(implicated premise) My mother would text me as soon as she was 
standing on the corner of the street. 
 
(implicated conclusion) My mother wants me to go down and meet her now. 
Explicatures 
 
(propositional form) My mother is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
(mood) My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
(attitude) My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
Logical form 
Writer’s utterance 
“I’m here” (text message) 
Decoding 
Developing 
(reference assignment) I  my mother 
(disambiguation) ’m  am standing 
(disambiguation) here  on the corner of the street 
(enrichment)  temporal aspect  now 
 
Reader’s propositional form 
My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
Inferring from the context, the propositional form and the propositional attitude 
Retrieving from memory and / or deducing from the explicatures and the context 
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Figure 1 is an illustration of the following imaginative situation: a mother and her daughter 
want to go to the movies. The daughter lives in a flat next to the movie theatre, but her 
doorbell is broken. Mother and daughter have agreed that the mother will send her 
daughter a text message as soon as she is standing on the corner of the street, after 
which the daughter is to go out to meet her mother, so they can go to the movies together. 
About half an hour before the beginning of the movie, the mother texts her daughter “I’m 
here.”  
As is shown in Figure 1, the daughter first reads the utterance, i.e. she decodes the 
graphic symbols into a logical form. Then, she assigns the utterance the right propositional 
form using referent assignment, disambiguation and enrichment. She further identifies 
the linguistic mood in which the utterance is expressed, as well as the attitude of her 
mother towards her utterance. These are three steps that relevance theory summarises 
as the development of a logical form, i.e. the process of assumption construction based 
on the logical form encoded by the utterance. The assumptions constructed in this phase 
of the communication process are all called explicatures. Finally, implicated premises are 
retrieved from memory, and from these implicated premises, the context and the 
explicatures the implicated conclusion is deduced. The implicated premises and the 
implicated conclusion are called implicatures. 
There are thus two distinct kinds of assumptions that can be recovered from an 
utterance, as is shown in Figure 2: explicatures and implicatures. Explicatures are 
assumptions resulting from the development of the logical form and inferences from the 
immediate context. They are said to be explicitly communicated. Implicatures are 
assumptions that rely on information that is further remote from the immediate act of 
communication. These assumptions are only implicitly communicated. What is innovative 
in the relevance-theoretic explicit-implicit dichotomy, is “that no assumption is simply 
decoded, and that the recovery of any assumption requires an element of inference” 
since every “explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually 
inferred conceptual features” (Sperber/Wilson 1995: 182). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Assumptions communicated by means of an utterance  
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3.5 Murtisari 
The possibilities of relevance theory for the notions of explicitation and implicitation were 
acknowledged by Murtisari (2013). She indeed suggested to approach explicitation and 
implicitation from a relevance-theoretic perspective. Her actual application of relevance 
theory to explicitation and implicitation, however, suffers from one major shortcoming 
that influences the whole of her theory, but that is, in her defence, a recurrent problem in 
translation studies, that was already pointed out by Gambier (2009: 63, 2010: 412) and 
addressed by Toury as the import of concepts “from other fields of knowledge (which is 
quite understandable), but [with] very little adjustment to the specificities of their new 
setting (which is less understandable and much less forgivable)” (Toury 2012: 35). To 
understand what explicit and implicit entail, Murtisari quoted the relevance-theoretic 
definitions as formulated by Carston (2002: 377):  
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit [hence an “explicature”] if and 
only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. An assumption communicated by 
U which is not explicit is implicit [hence an “implicature”].  
    (Carston 2002: 377 quoted by Murtisari 2013: 322) 
Relevance theory, Murtisari argued, could not only account for translation solutions 
applying information being translated from the implicatures of a source text to the 
explicatures of a target text and vice versa. It could also explain translation solutions 
which apply information from the explicatures only of the source text to the explicatures 
of the target text (Murtisari 2013: 329-340). 
Although the relevance-theoretic definitions work well within relevance theory, their 
unchanged transfer to translation studies is deemed to be problematic for three reasons. 
Firstly, they are descriptions of assumptions, in which explicitness and implicitness are 
merely described as characteristics of those assumptions. Secondly, the definitions 
present explicitness and implicitness as classificatory or categorical notions: an assumption 
is explicit or implicit. This is problematic when explicitation and implicitation (for which 
she coined the term de-explicitation (Murtisari 2013: 333) – we will come back to this 
claim in section 4) are defined as follows, implying that explicitness is a gradable notion 
(and that explicitness and implicitness need to be seen as comparative notions): 
Explicitation: “shifts of meaning from the implicit to the explicit or simply to a higher degree 
of explicitness.”   (Murtisari 2013: 332)  
De-explicitation: “to shift a particular meaning from the explicit to the implicit or to simply lower 
its degree of explicitness.”  (Murtisari 2013: 333)  
Although Murtisari refers to another quotation by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 182) saying 
that explicitness is indeed comparative, this cannot be found in their definitions of explicit 
and implicit assumptions. Thirdly, as explicitness and implicitness remain restricted to 
the level of assumptions, no link is made with utterances, which we believe should also 
be investigated in translation studies. In other words, where Hansen-Schirra, Neumann 
and Steiner (2007), Becher (2010a, 2011) and Krüger (2013) do not focus enough on 
meaning underlying an utterance, it seems that Murtisari (2013) solely focusses on 
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meaning, neglecting utterances. And while a theoretical framework that does not focus 
on utterances may well have its advantages, it cannot work for actual translation studies 
research. When Murtisari (2013: 330-332) conceptualises explicitation as a shift from the 
implicature to the explicature, or as a shift within the explicature to a higher level of 
explicitness, the result of the latter shift will not be observable in the utterance (see Figure 
8 in the Appendix). Although we strongly support Murtisari’s view that relevance theory 
is the theoretical framework that can help to define and explain explicitation and 
implicitation in translation studies, we believe that first and foremost the notions of 
explicitness and implicitness need redefining from within relevance theory and adjusting 
to translation studies. 
4 Defining Explicitness and Implicitness 
Relevance theory defines explicitness, we recall, as follows: “An assumption communi-
cated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form 
encoded by U” (Sperber/Wilson 1995: 182). However, as we have already pointed out in 
section 3.5, what is presented as a definition of explicitness is actually a definition of an 
explicitly communicated assumption, i.e. an explicature, rather than one of explicitness. 
Furthermore, this definition suffers from explicitness being presented as a categorical 
notion rather than the comparative one needed in translation studies to compare a 
source text with its target text. If explicitation and implicitation are an issue in translation, 
it is up to the translation studies researcher to compare the level of explicitness of utter-
ances. It also follows that the explicitness of utterances must be seen as a continuum 
and thus as a comparative notion: one utterance can be equally, less or more explicit 
than another. 
Whereas the definition of explicitness as formulated by relevance theory is thus not 
applicable to translation studies, the explanation following that definition is:  
An explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual 
features. The smaller the relative contribution of the contextual features, the more explicit the 
explicature will be, and inversely. Explicitness, so understood, is both classificatory and 
comparative: a communicated assumption is either an explicature or an implicature, but an 
explicature is explicit to a greater or lesser degree.  (Sperber/Wilson 1995: 182) 
In other words, the smaller the relative contribution of the contextually inferred conceptual 
features and the higher the relative contribution of the linguistically encoded conceptual 
features, the more explicit the explicature will be. Inversely, the higher the relative 
contribution of the contextually inferred conceptual features and the smaller the relative 
contribution of the linguistically encoded conceptual features, the less explicit the explicature 
will be. It follows that contextually inferred conceptual features, on the one hand, and 
linguistically encoded conceptual features, on the other hand, can be compared to 
communicating vessels: the more conceptual features are linguistically encoded by an 
utterance U, the fewer conceptual features the inference of which is needed, and the 
more an utterance U can be said to have contributed to the explicitness level of its 
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assumptions. Inversely, the fewer conceptual features are linguistically encoded by an 
utterance U, the more conceptual features the inference of which is needed, and the 
fewer an utterance U can be said to have contributed to the explicitness level of its 
assumptions. However, since assumptions are cognitive entities, it is only the linguistically 
encoded conceptual features that are observable in an utterance U. Because explicitness 
is directly proportional to the linguistic encoding of an assumption’s conceptual features 
by an utterance U, an utterance U can be said to determine an assumption’s explicitness 
level by linguistically encoding the conceptual features of that assumption. Based on this 
reasoning, we now want to suggest the following definition of the explicitness of an 
assumption: 
Explicitness is the quality of an assumption as determined by the linguistic encoding of its 
conceptual features by an utterance U. This quality can be described as a continuum and is 
only observable at the utterance level. 
Two important remarks need to be made. First, according to this definition, explicitness 
is not, nor could it ever be, a characteristic of an utterance. It remains a characteristic of 
an assumption, but it is observable in the utterance. Explicitness can thus be compared 
to temperature and the utterance to a thermometer. The fact that one can visualise tem-
perature with a thermometer, does not make temperature a characteristic of that ther-
mometer. Similarly, the fact that one can observe explicitness in an utterance, does not 
make explicitness a characteristic of that utterance. Like temperature, explicitness is 
described as a quality that lies on a scale, with on the one end absolute explicitness and 
on the other end the absence of explicitness. Absolute explicitness would mean that all 
conceptual features of an assumption are linguistically encoded. Although theoretically 
possible, this is impossible in praxis, as absolute explicitness would result in an endless 
utterance the understanding of which would not require any developing or inference at 
all. At the other end of the scale, any explicitness is absent.  
The second remark concerns this absence of explicitness, or, as we want to call it, 
implicitness. 
Implicitness can be understood as negative explicitness: the more an assumption is said to 
be explicit, the less it is implicit, and vice versa. 
This implies that we do not assume a clear cut-off point between explicitness and 
implicitness, allowing for the expressions more explicit and less implicit, on the one hand, 
and less explicit and more implicit, on the other hand, to be used interchangeably when 
comparing the explicitness level of the assumptions communicated by two utterances. 
This is visualised in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3: Explicitness scale  
Because explicitness is comparative according to our model, so is implicitness. This 
contradicts with relevance theory, in which implicitness, which is restricted to the 
implicatures, is only classificatory. It is in this context that Murtisari (2013: 333) 
suggested replacing the term implicitation by de-explicitation: according to relevance 
theory, an assumption cannot be made more implicit, only implicit. This is because 
Murtisari, like relevance theory, only considers the explicitness or implicitness level of 
assumptions, whereas our model focusses on the conceptual features of assumptions. 
Our view on explicitness and implicitness suggests that every assumption that is commu-
nicated verbally, be it an explicature or an implicature, may involve explicitness to a 
certain extent. In other words, implicatures, too, can be partly explicit, given that some 
of their conceptual features are encoded in the utterance, as is the case for utterance (2) 
and its implicature (9), in which for example ‘standing’ and ‘corner’ are conceptual 
features occurring in both the utterance and the implicature: 
(2)  I am standing on the corner. 
(9) My mother would text me as soon as she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
All communicated assumptions balance between the two ends of the explicitness scale. 
The more conceptual features of the assumptions triggered by an utterance are encoded 
by that utterance (and the fewer conceptual features the inference of which is needed), 
the more explicit the assumption is, and inversely. When applying the framework to the 
examples given in the introduction, the intuitive rise in explicitness assumed from utter-
ances (1-4) can now be theoretically motivated:  
(1)  I’m here. 
(2)  I am standing on the corner. 
(3)  I am now standing on the street corner. 
(4)  I am now standing on the street corner where we were going to meet. 
Given that utterances (1-4) refer to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar 
communicative situation, utterance (2) encodes more conceptual features than utterance (1), 
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namely ‘am standing’ and ‘on the corner’, which are conceptual features from the 
explicature of utterance (1). Utterance (4) encodes more conceptual features than 
utterance (3), namely ‘where we were going to meet’, thus encoding conceptual features 
from the implicature of utterance (3). According to the definition of explicitness, the 
assumptions of utterances (2) and (4) are more explicit (less implicit) than those of 
utterances (1) and (3) respectively. Vice versa, utterances (1) and (3) encode fewer 
conceptual features than utterances (2) and (4) respectively, because of which their as-
sumptions can be considered less explicit (more implicit).  
Recalling that the general interpretation given to explicitation involves something 
being more explicit or less implicit than something else, and the general interpretation 
given to implicitation involves something being more implicit or less explicit than some-
thing else, it should be clear that the above discussion of differences in the explicitness 
level of utterances (1-4) paves the way to defining explicitation and implicitation within a 
relevance-theoretic framework, which is what we will do in section 5. 
5 Defining Explicitation and Implicitation 
5.1 Explicitation and Implicitation of Utterances  
Based on the above discussion of differences in the explicitness level of utterances (1-4), 
we can define explicitation and implicitation as follows:  
Explicitation is the result of encoding developed or inferred conceptual features from the 
explicatures and/or implicatures of utterance A in a new utterance, thus producing utterance 
B, some of whose assumptions can be shown to be more explicit (less implicit) than the 
assumptions of utterance A, given that utterances A and B refer to the same state of affairs 
when produced in a similar communicative situation.  
Implicitation is the result of excluding some inferable conceptual features encoded in utter-
ance A from a new utterance, thus producing utterance B, some of whose assumptions are 
less explicit (more implicit) than the assumptions of utterance A, given that utterances A and 
B refer to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar communicative situation.  
To put it differently, explicitation means that a conceptual feature which is absent at 
utterance A level but included in an explicature or implicature of utterance A is expressed 
at utterance B level.3 Implicitation means that a conceptual feature which is expressed 
at utterance A level is absent at utterance B level but included in an explicature or 
implicature of utterance B.4 There is thus always a link between the utterance level and 
                                                
3  Note that if a conceptual feature which is absent at utterance A level but included in an explicature of 
utterance A is present at utterance B level, utterances A and B still have the same explicatures (see 
Figure 8 in the Appendix). However, if a conceptual feature which is absent at utterance A level but 
included in an implicature of utterance A is present at utterance B level, it is also present in the 
explicature of utterance B (see Figure 10 in the Appendix).  
4  Note that if a conceptual feature which is present at utterance A level is absent at utterance B level but 
present in an explicature of utterance B, utterances A and B still have the same explicatures (see Figure 
9 in the Appendix). However, if a conceptual feature which is present at utterance A level, and thus in 
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the assumption level. This can be schematized as follows (see Appendix for more 
elaborate schemata of the utterances and their assumptions): 
utterance A  utterance B  utterance A  utterance B 
explicatures  explicatures  explicatures  explicatures
implicatures  implicatures  implicatures  implicatures
Fig. 6: Explicitation Fig. 7: Implicitation  
We want to stress that explicitation and implicitation are only said to be observable 
between utterances that refer to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar 
communicative situation. Through explicitation or implicitation, the state of affairs is not 
changed. What does change, is the focus: certain conceptual features that are communi-
cated by utterance A can be highlighted or underexposed in utterance B, without, however, 
altering the state of affairs referred to by that utterance. This is of crucial importance. It 
makes it legitimate to call a translation from (1) into (2) an explicitation, because (2) 
encodes more conceptual features than (1) and both utterances refer to the same state 
of affairs when produced in a similar communicative situation. This is, however, not the 
case for utterances (1) and (10).  
(1)  I’m here. 
(2)  I am standing on the corner. 
(10) The president of the committee praised the interpreter for her good work. 
Although (10) undisputedly encodes more conceptual features than (1), (10) also refers 
to a completely different state of affairs than (1). Replacing (1) by (10), for whatever 
reason thinkable, will not be considered as an explicitation (see section 6). 
Note that the definitions of explicitation and implicitation are applicable both to mono-
lingual communication and to translation; as soon as two utterances are compared, 
explicitation and implicitation may be observed. Suppose that the mother in our example 
texts (1) to her daughter, who is working very hard on her computer to meet a deadline 
and is not really thinking of anything else. If the daughter is confused by the message 
and replies with (11), the mother will probably encode more conceptual features into her 
utterance and answer with (12). Suppose now that the daughter, who is just too pre-
occupied with her work to think about what her mother is trying to make clear (because 
understanding an utterance requires effort, which not everyone wants to spend in every 
                                                
an explicature of utterance A, is absent at utterance B level but present in an implicature of utterance 
B, it is also absent in the explicature of utterance B (see Figure 11 in the Appendix).  
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situation) asks (13), the mother can encode the implicated conclusion that she wants her 
daughter to deduce to the utterance level by answering with (14): 
(1)  I’m here. 
(11)  Where? 
(12) On the corner of the street ;-) 
(13) WDYM? [What do you mean?] 
(14) We wanted to go to the movies together. Please come down and meet me 
now.  
In this example of monolingual communication, utterances (12) and (14) can be consid-
ered as involving explicitation of utterance (1).  
Across languages, too, the explicitness level of utterances can be compared, since 
using a foreign word or expression for a similar concept does not necessarily change the 
conception of the concept itself. When comparing utterances across languages, the link 
with translation studies is easily established. Suppose that the conversation between the 
mother and her daughter is actually a dialogue in an English novel. Suppose further that 
this novel is translated into German, in which utterances (12) and (14) are translated by 
utterances (15) and (16) respectively. The difference between (12) and (15) can be called 
an explicitation, whereas the difference between (14) and (16) can be called an implicitation. 
(15) Ich stehe an der Straßenecke ;-) [I am standing on the street corner :-)] 
(16) Komm’ bitte runter. [Please come down.] 
5.2 Explicitation and Implicitation of Parts of Utterances  
Up until now, we have focussed on whole utterances, but this focus on utterances might 
become challenging when actually doing corpus-based research, because utterances 
can be very long and complex; in fact, it can be questioned whether a translation of an 
utterance A into an utterance B will always (if at all) involve only explicitation or only 
implicitation. The issue actually already becomes more complex when an utterance is 
longer than a few words. Letters, speeches or even entire literary texts can be considered 
as one utterance, too. It only takes common sense to understand that a translation of 
such a long and complex utterance can never involve only explicitation or only implicitation. 
More likely, the verbal encoding of conceptual features of a source text utterance into a 
translated utterance will yield both a higher and a lower degree of explicitness simul-
taneously (see Figures 12, 13 and 14 in the Appendix). It is therefore necessary to 
conceptualize explicitation and implicitation as applicable to parts of utterances, too, 
which is common practice in corpus-based translation studies. Our definitions of 
explicitation and implicitation indeed allow for a focus on parts of utterances, too. 
Suppose that utterance (18) is a translation of utterance (17): 
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(17)  I am standing on the corner where we were going to meet. 
(18)  Ich stehe an der Straßenecke. [I am standing on the street corner.] 
Utterance (18) encodes the conceptual feature ‘Straße’ (‘street’), that is part of one of 
the explicatures of utterance (17), thus yielding assumptions underlying utterance (18) 
that are more explicit than the corresponding ones underlying (17). Simultaneously, 
however, (18) does not encode the conceptual features of ‘where we were going to 
meet’, resulting in an utterance that only yields the corresponding part of utterance (17) 
at the implicature level of utterance (18), rendering this assumption less explicit. In other 
words, two contrasting solutions can be observed within one utterance, so that we need 
to see this translation as involving a combination of explicitation and implicitation.  
6 Addition, Omission and Substitution 
6.1 Addition and Omission 
Having defined explicitness, implicitness, explicitation and implicitation, one last question 
remains that was raised by Hansen-Schirra, Neumann and Steiner (2007: 244) and 
Krüger (2013: 301,306-309): how can explicitation and implicitation be distinguished 
from addition and omission, respectively? The answer to this question will take recourse 
to the inferable conceptual features of an utterance. Given that utterances A and B refer 
to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar communicative situation, addition 
and omission can be said to have taken place where certain conceptual features are not 
in any way inferable from one of both utterances or their contexts. Addition and omission 
can thus be defined as follows: 
Addition is the result of encoding conceptual features that were not in any way inferable 
from utterance A or its context in a new utterance, thus producing an utterance B, given that 
utterances A and B refer to the same state of affairs when produced in a similar com-
municative situation. 
Omission is the result of excluding conceptual features of utterance A that are not in any 
way inferable from utterance B or its context from a new utterance, thus producing an 
utterance B, given that utterances A and B refer to the same state of affairs when produced 
in a similar communicative situation. 
Where the difference between (2) and (18) involves explicitation, the difference between 
(2) and (19) involves according to our definition addition, because new meaningful 
conceptual features ‘vor dem Café’ (‘in front of the café’) that were not in any way 
inferable from (2) or its context are added in (19). Similarly, where the difference between 
(20) and (21) involves implicitation, because the aspect ‘military’ can be inferred, the 
difference between (20) and (22) involves omission, given that the kind of salute is not 
in any way inferable from the context of utterance (22) (it might be a salute with a 
ceremonial sword).  
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(2) I am standing on the corner. 
(18) Ich stehe an der Straßenecke. [I am standing on the street corner.] 
(19) Ich stehe vor dem Café an der Ecke. [I am standing in front of the café on the 
corner.] 
(20) The soldier raised his hand in a military hand salute. 
(21) Der Soldat hob seine Hand zum Grüßen. [The soldier raised his hand to salute.] 
(22) Der Soldat grüßte. [The soldier made a salute.] 
6.2 Substitution 
While explicitation and implicitation, on the one hand, and addition and omission, on the 
other hand, are only observable between utterances that refer to the same state of affairs 
when produced in a similar communicative situation, substitution can be said to have 
taken place where the state of affairs in utterance B is different from that in A, as in (23) 
and (24). Through substitution, conceptual features such as action/event/state, person, 
time, place, or reason are deleted and added simultaneously; substitution is, therefore, 
a combination of addition and omission, which can be defined as follows: 
Given that utterances A and B are produced in a similar communicative situation, substitution 
is the result of producing an utterance B that refers to a different state of affairs than an 
utterance A, by omitting one or more meaningful conceptual features from utterance A that 
are not in any way inferable from utterance B or its context and replacing these by one or 
more meaningful conceptual features that were not in any way inferable from utterance A or 
its context. 
(23) Heathrow is the biggest airport of the capital.  
(24) Tegel ist der größte Flughafen der Hauptstadt. [Tegel is the biggest airport of 
the capital.] 
When describing translation solutions in corpus-based translation studies, we believe it 
to be necessary to distinguish not only between explicitation and implicitation, but 
between addition, omission and substitution, because these five solution possibilities are 
closely related yet very distinct from one another. 
7 Beyond Definitions: Explaining Why 
Having identified and defined five important translation solutions, one may still wonder 
why translators would sometimes be more or less explicit about certain conceptual 
features from a source text utterance in their target text utterance, or why they would 
sometimes even change the state of affairs referred to by the source text utterance.  
Becher argued that the reason for explicitation in translation relates to the cultural 
distance between the source text author and the target text reader and to the risk of 
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miscommunication that this cultural distance involves. To bridge the cultural gap and to 
minimize communicative risk, the translator may decide to insert explicitations into the 
translation, because the choice of the more explicit option will less likely lead to a “com-
municative breakdown” (Becher 2010a: 20) than that of the less explicit option. Becher 
claimed that being too explicit only carries the risk of wasting energy and paper, whereas 
being not explicit enough carries the “risk of not being understood” (Becher 2010a: 20), 
which should be avoided at all costs. With this argument, Becher motivated the 
preference for explicitation over implicitation as assumed by the asymmetry hypothesis 
(Klaudy 2001 quoted from Klaudy/Károly 2005: 14), but “allowing for exceptional cases 
where cultural distance is insignificant and/or communicative risk is low. In these cases, 
we do not expect explicitations to outnumber implicitations” (Becher 2010a: 22). 
There are three problems with this view. In the first place, it does not offer any expla-
nation for the presence of instances of implicitation: why a translator should opt for a 
translation that is less explicit, is not discussed. In addition, and contrary to what Becher 
claimed, we believe that being too explicit may carry a similar risk of communicative 
breakdown. For example, when presenting information in such a way that it is felt to be 
too superfluous and irrelevant, the audience might be inclined to stop communication 
altogether. Thus, being too explicit carries a similar risk of communicative breakdown. 
Finally, within a relevance-theoretic framework, the occurrence of implicitation, too, can 
be linked to minimizing risk and maximizing relevance.  
The latter was acknowledged and explained by Pym, who modelled explicitation and 
implicitation within a risk-management framework. He defined risk as “the probability of 
an undesired outcome”, in which “undesired outcomes are those that restrict cooperation 
between the communication partners; desirable outcomes are those that enhance the 
potential for cooperation” (Pym 2005: 34). Translation, Pym stated, “involves communication 
into a context with fewer shared references, it involves greater risks than non-translation 
[… and] where there are greater risks, there are greater opportunities for risk minimization” 
(Pym 2005: 41). To avoid or at least reduce these communicative risks, translators may 
opt for explicitation or implicitation: rendering source text utterance conceptual features 
more or less explicit in the target text may avoid complications and miscommunication 
between the source text author and the target text reader, depending on the translation 
situation, a view that could “gain credence from an application of relevance theory” (Pym 
2005: 39).  
Indeed, for Gutt translation strategies, tactics and solutions could be connected with 
meeting the assumed needs of the target text audience. In addition, all translation 
strategies, tactics and solutions, Gutt argued, could be unified into only one true trans-
lation strategy (which he called a principle), namely doing: 
what is consistent with the search for optimal relevance. What differs [between strategies, 
tactics and solutions] are the specific applications of this principle that take into account 
differences in cognitive environment that may change the accessibility of particular pieces of 
contextual information and hence may affect the relevance of the text or utterance in that 
context.    (Gutt 1991/2000: 124) 
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Minimizing risk and maximizing relevance for their envisaged audience can thus be 
considered as the overriding translation strategy that leads translators to be strongly 
aware of the relevance principle, perhaps more strongly so than monolingual communicators 
– a hypothesis that can be linked to Baker’s (1993) investigation in comparative explicit-
ness. Explicitation, implicitation, addition, omission and substitution, too, can thus be 
understood as five possible applications of this general strategy: if optimal relevance is 
believed to be best achieved through explicitation, for example by encoding cultural 
background in the translation of a tourist information leaflet, then explicitation is opted 
for. If optimal relevance is believed to be best achieved through implicitation, for example 
by making certain vulgar language more implicit in translation, then implicitation is opted 
for. And finally, if optimal relevance is believed to be best achieved through addition, 
omission or substitution, for example by changing the reference to ‘Heathrow’ in an 
English source text to ‘Tegel’ in its German translation, then these solutions are opted 
for.  
8 Conclusion 
This contribution presents a set of new definitions for the concepts of explicitation and 
implicitation, which have been mentioned and researched so frequently in translation 
studies history but never fully understood, nor satisfactorily defined. We have argued 
that the reason for this can be found in the fact that the concepts of explicitness and 
implicitness, which are a prerequisite for understanding explicitation and implicitation, 
have mainly relied on intuition rather than on theory and never been thoroughly defined 
in translation studies either.  
Starting from the assumption that translation is an act of communication and should 
therefore best be studied in the light of a cognitive communication theory, we follow 
Murtisari’s (2013) idea to adopt relevance theory as a suitable framework for the 
definitions of explicitation and implicitation, because the explicit-implicit dichotomy 
underlying relevance theory lends itself to defining explicitness and implicitness. Unlike 
Murtisari, however, we have adapted the definition of explicitness as formulated by 
relevance theory and redefined explicitness and implicitness as comparative concepts. 
We have also established a link between utterances, explicatures and implicatures. 
Then, we have defined explicitation and implicitation and have illustrated that they are 
not restricted to translation, but can be found in monolingual communication as well. We 
have argued that explicitation and implicitation can and should be distinguished from 
addition, omission and substitution. Finally, we have agreed with Gutt (1991/2000) and 
Pym (2005) that explicitation, implicitation, addition, omission and substitution appear in 
translation because it is an act of communication involving much communicative risk. 
Explicitation, implicitation, addition, omission and substitution may be ways to reduce the 
amount of risk, depending on the translation situation. They help the translator obtain 
optimal relevance for the target text audience.  
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In conclusion, we have argued that translation studies in general and corpus-based 
translation studies in particular can greatly benefit from an application of relevance theory 
when it comes to defining and understanding two of its core concepts: explicitation and 
implicitation.  
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Appendix: Utterances and Their Assumptions 
Explicitation means that a conceptual feature which is absent at utterance A level but 
included in an explicature or implicature of utterance A is expressed at utterance B level. 
Implicitation means that a conceptual feature which is expressed at utterance A level is 
absent at utterance B level but included in an explicature or implicature of utterance B. 
 A  B 
utterances I’m here.  I am on the corner. 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street. 
 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 8: Explicitation involving conceptual features from the explicature 
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 A  B 
utterances I am on the corner.  I’m here. 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street. 
 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 9: Implicitation involving conceptual features from the explicature 
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 A  B 
utterances I’m here.  I’m here. Will you come 
down and meet me? 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street. 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street and asks me if I 
want to come down now and meet 
her. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street and asks me if I want to 
come down now and meet her. 
 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 10: Explicitation involving conceptual features from the implicature 
  
Hinde De Metsenaere & Sonia Vandepitte trans-kom 10 [3] (2017): 385-419 
Towards a Theoretical Foundation for Explicitation and Implicitation Seite 415 
 
 
 
 A  B 
utterances I’m here. Will you come 
down and meet me? 
 I’m here. 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 11: Implicitation involving conceptual features from the implicature 
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 A  B 
utterances I’m here.  I am on the corner. Will 
you come down and meet 
me? 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the 
street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street. 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street and asks me if I 
want to come down now and meet 
her. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street and asks me if I want to 
come down now and meet her. 
 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 12: Explicitation involving conceptual features from the explicature and the implicature 
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 A  B 
utterances I am on the corner. Will 
you come down and 
meet me? 
 I’m here. 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 13: Implicitation involving conceptual features from the explicature and the implicature 
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 A  B 
utterances I’m here. Will you come 
down and meet me? 
 I am on the corner. 
explicatures My mother is now standing on the corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street 
and asks me if I want to come down 
now and meet her. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the 
corner of the street and asks me if 
I want to come down now and meet 
her. 
 
 My mother is now standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother asserts that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother believes that she is now 
standing on the corner of the street. 
My mother intends to communicate 
that she is now standing on the corner 
of the street. 
implicatures Implicated premises My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon 
as she was standing on the corner 
of the street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down 
and meet her now. 
 
 Implicated premises 
My mother and I want to go to the 
movies together. 
My mother would text me as soon as 
she was standing on the corner of the 
street. 
 
Implicated conclusion 
My mother wants me to go down and 
meet her now. 
 
Fig. 14: Explicitation and implicitation involving conceptual features from the explicature and the 
implicature respectively 
 
 
  
Hinde De Metsenaere & Sonia Vandepitte trans-kom 10 [3] (2017): 385-419 
Towards a Theoretical Foundation for Explicitation and Implicitation Seite 419 
 
 
 
Authors 
Hinde De Metsenaere is a junior assistant at the Department of Translation, Interpreting and 
Communication at Ghent University and member of its German section. She is currently preparing 
a doctoral dissertation on explicitation and implicitation of Dutch and German nominal compounds 
under supervision of Sonia Vandepitte (Ghent University), Petra Campe (Ghent University), 
Torsten Leuschner (Ghent University) and Silvia Hansen-Schirra (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität 
Mainz). She teaches German language practice and writing skills.  
E-mail: hinde.demetsenaere@ugent.be 
Website: http://research.flw.ugent.be/nl/hinde.demetsenaere 
Sonia Vandepitte is a full professor at the Department of Translation, Interpreting and Commu-
nication at Ghent University and head of its English section. She teaches English, translation 
studies, and translation into and from Dutch. Publication topics include causal expressions in 
language and translation, methodology in translation studies, translation competences, anti-
cipation in interpreting, international translation training projects and translation and post-editing 
processes. She is currently involved in eyetracking research into reading and translation 
processes of translation problem-solving.   
E-Mail: sonia.vandepitte@ugent.be 
Website: http://research.flw.ugent.be/nl/sonia.vandepitte 
 
Neu bei Frank & Timme
Frank & Timme
Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur
TransÜD. Arbeiten zur 
Theorie und Praxis des 
Übersetzens und Dolmetschens
Herausgegeben von 
Prof. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Baumann, 
Dr. Susanne Hagemann,
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hartwig Kalverkämper,  
Prof. Dr. Klaus Schubert
Christiane Nord: Traducir, una actividad con 
propósito. Introducción a los enfoques funcio-
nalistas. ISBN 978-3-7329-0410-5
Ursula Wienen / Laura Sergo / Tinka Reichmann  / 
Ivonne Gutiérrez Aristizábal (Hg.): Translation 
und Ökonomie. ISBN 978-3-7329-0203-3
Alexander Künzli: Die Untertitelung – von  
der Produktion zur Rezeption.  
ISBN 978-3-7329-0393-1
TTT: Transkulturalität – 
Translation – Transfer
Herausgegeben von 
Prof. Dr. Dörte Andres, Dr. Martina Behr, 
Prof. Dr. Larisa Schippel,
Dr. Cornelia Zwischenberger
 
Simon Zupan /Aleksandra Nucˇ   (eds.):  
Interpreting Studies at the Crossroads of  
Disciplines. ISBN 978-3-7329-0045-9
Lars Felgner: Nonverbale Kommunikation 
beim medizinischen Dolmetschen. 
ISBN 978-3-7329-0386-3
Martina Behr / Sabine Seubert (Hg.): Education 
is a Whole-Person Process. Von ganzheitlicher 
Lehre, Dolmetschforschung und anderen
Dingen. ISBN 978-3-7329-0324-5
FFF: Forum für 
Fachsprachen-Forschung
Herausgegeben von 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hartwig Kalverkämper
Annikki Liimatainen et al. (eds.): Legal Trans-
lation and Court Interpreting: Ethical Values, 
Quality, Competence Training.
ISBN 978-3-7329-0295-8
Sascha Bechmann (Hg.): Sprache und Medizin. 
Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur medizinischen 
Sprache und Kommunikation.
ISBN 978-3-7329-0372-6
Wittelsbacherstraße 27a, D-10707 Berlin
Telefon (030) 88 66 79 11, Fax (030) 88 39 87 31
info@frank-timme.de, www.frank-timme.de
